diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6398fa6..df12ba2 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ Kernel space: - Entirely disable the SysRq key so that the Secure Attention Key (SAK) can no longer be utilized. See [documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/SysRq). +- Optional - Disable all use of user namespaces. + - Optional - Restrict user namespaces to `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` as they can lead to substantial privilege escalation. -- Optional - Disable all use of user namespaces. - - Restrict kernel profiling and the performance events system to `CAP_PERFMON`. - Force the kernel to panic on both "oopses", which can potentially indicate and thwart diff --git a/etc/default/grub.d/40_cpu_mitigations.cfg b/etc/default/grub.d/40_cpu_mitigations.cfg index 1b900c0..fa750b7 100644 --- a/etc/default/grub.d/40_cpu_mitigations.cfg +++ b/etc/default/grub.d/40_cpu_mitigations.cfg @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ## If there is no explicit KSPP compliance notice, the setting is not mentioned by the KSPP. ## Enable known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities. +## Note, the mitigations for SSB and Retbleed are not currently mentioned in the first link. ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html ## https://forums.whonix.org/t/should-all-kernel-patches-for-cpu-bugs-be-unconditionally-enabled-vs-performance-vs-applicability/7647 @@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ ## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance.html ## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/disclosure-documentation.html -## Enable a subset of known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT. +## Enable a subset of known mitigations for some CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT. ## ## KSPP=yes ## KSPP sets the kernel parameters. @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mitigations=auto,nosmt" ## Disable SMT as it has been the cause of and amplified numerous CPU exploits. ## The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable SMT. ## Disabling will significantly decrease system performance on multi-threaded tasks. -## To enable SMT, remove this line and all other occurrences of "nosmt" in this file. +## Note, this setting will prevent re-enabling SMT via the sysfs interface. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html ## https://forums.whonix.org/t/should-all-kernel-patches-for-cpu-bugs-be-unconditionally-enabled-vs-performance-vs-applicability/7647/17 @@ -36,95 +37,136 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mitigations=auto,nosmt" ## KSPP=yes ## KSPP sets the kernel parameter. ## +## To re-enable SMT: +## - Remove "nosmt=force". +## - Remove all occurrences of ",nosmt" in this file (note the comma ","). +## - Downgrade "l1tf=full,force" protection to "l1tf=flush". +## - Regenerate the dracut initramfs and then reboot system. +## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX nosmt=force" -## Enable mitigations for both Spectre Variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) -## and Intel branch history injection (BHI) vulnerabilities. +## Spectre Side Channels (BTI and BHI): +## Unconditionally enable mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection). +## Enable mitigation for the Intel branch history injection vulnerability. +## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_v2=on" GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_bhi=on" -## Disable Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre Variant 4). -## Unconditionally enable mitigation for both kernel and userspace. +## Speculative Store Bypass (SSB): +## Mitigate Spectre Variant 4 by disabling speculative store bypass system-wide. +## Unconditionally enable the mitigation for both kernel and userspace. +## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs. ## +## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass ## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189 ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_store_bypass_disable=on" GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX ssbd=force-on" -## Enable mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability through disabling SMT -## and L1D flush runtime control. +## L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF): +## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling L1D flush runtime control and SMT. +## If L1D flushing is conditional, mitigate the vulnerability for certain KVM hypervisor configurations. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1tf=full,force" +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=always" -## Enable mitigations for the MDS vulnerability through clearing buffer cache -## and disabling SMT. +## Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS): +## Mitigate the vulnerability by clearing the CPU buffer cache and disabling SMT. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mds=full,nosmt" -## Patches the TAA vulnerability by disabling TSX and enables mitigations using -## TSX Async Abort along with disabling SMT. +## TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA): +## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling TSX. +## If TSX is enabled, clear CPU buffer rings on transitions and disable SMT. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx=off" GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt" -## Mark all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable to mitigate iTLB multihit. +## iTLB Multihit: +## Mitigate the vulnerability by marking all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm.nx_huge_pages=force" -## Mitigations for SRBDS to prevent MDS attacks on RDRAND and RDSEED instructions -## are only possible through microcode updates from Intel. +## Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS): +## Mitigation of the vulnerability is only possible via microcode update from Intel. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.html ## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142691 -## Enable the prctl() interface to prevent leaks from L1D on context switches. +## L1D Flushing: +## Mitigate leaks from the L1D cache on context switches by enabling the prctl() interface. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1d_flush=on" -## Mitigate numerous MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and disable SMT. +## Processor MMIO Stale Data: +## Mitigate the vulnerabilities by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer and disabling SMT. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt" -## Enable mitigations for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with -## Return Instructions) vulnerability and disable SMT. +## Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions (Retbleed): +## Mitigate the vulnerability through CPU-dependent implementation and disable SMT. +## Currently affects both AMD Zen 1-2 and Intel CPUs. ## +## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retbleed +## https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/retbleed/ ## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693 +## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/retbleed ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX retbleed=auto,nosmt" -## Control RAS overflow mitigation on AMD Zen CPUs. +## Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions: +## Mitigate the vulnerability for certain KVM hypervisor configurations. +## Currently affects AMD Zen 1-2 CPUs. +## +## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.html +## +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm.mitigate_smt_rsb=1" + +## Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO): +## Mitigate the vulnerability by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location. +## Currently affects AMD Zen 1-4 CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html ## ## The default kernel setting will be utilized until provided sufficient evidence to modify. +## Using "spec_rstack_overflow=ipbp" may provide stronger security at a greater performance impact. ## #GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret" -## Enable Gather Data Sampling (GDS) mitigation. -## Note for systems that have not received a suitable microcode update this will -## entirely disable use of the AVX instructions set. +## Gather Data Sampling (GDS): +## Mitigate the vulnerability either via microcode update or by disabling AVX. +## Note, without a suitable microcode update, this will entirely disable use of the AVX instructions set. +## Currently affects Intel CPUs. ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.html ## GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX gather_data_sampling=force" -## Enable Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) mitigation on Intel Atom CPUs which -## encompasses E-cores on hybrid architectures. +## Register File Data Sampling (RFDS): +## Mitigate the vulnerability by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer. +## Currently affects Intel Atom CPUs (which encompasses E-cores on hybrid architectures). ## ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.html ## diff --git a/etc/default/grub.d/41_recovery_restrict.cfg b/etc/default/grub.d/41_recovery_restrict.cfg index cfe68b0..530a728 100644 --- a/etc/default/grub.d/41_recovery_restrict.cfg +++ b/etc/default/grub.d/41_recovery_restrict.cfg @@ -7,10 +7,15 @@ ## KSPP=no: not (currently) compliant with recommendations by the KSPP ## If there is no explicit KSPP compliance notice, the setting is not mentioned by the KSPP. -## Disable access to single-user mode (i.e. recovery mode). +## Disable access to single-user (recovery) mode. +## ## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/remove-linux-recovery-mode-boot-option-from-default-grub-boot-menu/727 -GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY='true' +## +GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY="true" ## Disable access to Dracut's recovery console. +## ## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/harden-dracut-initramfs-generator-by-disabling-recovery-console/724 -GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT rd.shell=0 rd.emergency=halt" +## +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT rd.emergency=halt" +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT rd.shell=0" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf b/usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf index 93efe26..4cf6bb6 100644 --- a/usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf +++ b/usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf @@ -117,42 +117,41 @@ vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=0 ## kernel.sysrq=0 -## Restrict user namespaces to users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. +## Disable user namespaces entirely. ## User namespaces aim to improve sandboxing and accessibility for unprivileged users. -## Unprivileged user namespaces pose substantial privilege escalation risks. -## Restricting may lead to breakages in numerous software packages. -## -## Flatpak requires unprivileged users to create new user namespaces for sandboxing. -## https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/wiki/User-namespace-requirements -## https://salsa.debian.org/debian/bubblewrap/-/blob/debian/latest/debian/README.Debian -## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/can-not-run-flatpak-apps-after-kicksecure-update/592 -## ## Disabling entirely will reduce compatibility with some AppArmor profiles. ## Disabling entirely is known to break the UPower systemd service. -## -## Also breaks (some?) AppImages. -## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/cannot-run-some-appimage-apps-after-kicksecure-upate/594 -## -## Might also break evolution (e-mail client): -## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/impossible-to-start-evolution-app-since-the-last-update/601 +## Not recommended due to well-known breakages across numerous software packages. ## ## https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/ ## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#kernel -## https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/unprivileged_userns_restriction ## https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hardening-checker#questions-and-answers ## https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/84522#issuecomment-614640601 -## https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/wiki/User-namespace-requirements ## https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/pull/263 -## https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/issues/274 ## ## KSPP=no -## KSPP sets user.max_user_namespaces=0 sysctl, a Linux mainline, stricter setting. +## KSPP sets the sysctl. ## -## kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone is a Debian specific kernel feature. Not Linux mainline. -#kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 -## Uncomment the following sysctl to entirely disable user namespaces. #user.max_user_namespaces=0 +## Restrict user namespaces to users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. +## See the user.max_user_namespaces setting for more details. +## This is a Debian-specific kernel feature, not a Linux mainline setting. +## Unprivileged user namespaces pose substantial privilege escalation risks. +## Flatpak requires unprivileged users to create new user namespaces for sandboxing. +## Restricting is known to cause breakages in some AppImages and the Evolution Email Client. +## Not recommended due to widespread breakages across many software packages. +## +## https://salsa.debian.org/debian/bubblewrap/-/blob/debian/latest/debian/README.Debian +## https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/unprivileged_userns_restriction +## https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/wiki/User-namespace-requirements +## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/can-not-run-flatpak-apps-after-kicksecure-update/592 +## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/cannot-run-some-appimage-apps-after-kicksecure-upate/594 +## https://forums.kicksecure.com/t/impossible-to-start-evolution-app-since-the-last-update/601 +## https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/issues/274 +## +#kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 + ## Restricts kernel profiling to users with CAP_PERFMON. ## The performance events system should not be accessible by unprivileged users. ## Other distributions such as Ubuntu and Fedora may permit further restricting. @@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ fs.protected_fifos=2 fs.protected_regular=2 ## Enable ASLR for mmap base, stack, VDSO pages, and heap. -## Forces shared libraries to be loaded to random addresses +## Forces shared libraries to be loaded to random addresses. ## Start location of PIE-linked binaries is randomized. ## Heap randomization can lead to breakages with legacy applications. ##