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Refactor CPU mitigations
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance.html
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## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/disclosure-documentation.html
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## Enable a subset of known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
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## Enable a subset of known mitigations for some CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
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##
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## KSPP=yes
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## KSPP sets the kernel parameters.
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mitigations=auto,nosmt"
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## Disable SMT as it has been the cause of and amplified numerous CPU exploits.
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## The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable SMT.
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## Disabling will significantly decrease system performance on multi-threaded tasks.
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## To enable SMT, remove this line and all other occurrences of "nosmt" in this file.
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## Note, this setting will prevent re-enabling SMT via the sysfs interface.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/should-all-kernel-patches-for-cpu-bugs-be-unconditionally-enabled-vs-performance-vs-applicability/7647/17
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@ -36,95 +36,125 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mitigations=auto,nosmt"
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## KSPP=yes
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## KSPP sets the kernel parameter.
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##
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## To re-enable SMT:
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## - Remove "nosmt=force".
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## - Remove all occurrences of ",nosmt" in this file (note the comma ",").
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## - Downgrade "l1tf=full,force" protection to "l1tf=flush".
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX nosmt=force"
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## Enable mitigations for both Spectre Variant 2 (indirect branch speculation)
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## and Intel branch history injection (BHI) vulnerabilities.
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## Spectre Side Channels (BTI and BHI):
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## Unconditionally enable mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection).
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## Enable mitigation for the Intel branch history injection vulnerability.
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## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_v2=on"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_bhi=on"
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## Disable Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre Variant 4).
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## Unconditionally enable mitigation for both kernel and userspace.
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## Speculative Store Bypass (SSB):
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## Mitigate Spectre Variant 4 by disabling speculative store bypass system-wide.
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## Unconditionally enable the mitigation for both kernel and userspace.
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## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass
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## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_store_bypass_disable=on"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX ssbd=force-on"
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## Enable mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability through disabling SMT
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## and L1D flush runtime control.
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## L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling L1D flush runtime control and SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1tf=full,force"
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## Enable mitigations for the MDS vulnerability through clearing buffer cache
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## and disabling SMT.
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## Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by clearing the buffer cache and disabling SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mds=full,nosmt"
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## Patches the TAA vulnerability by disabling TSX and enables mitigations using
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## TSX Async Abort along with disabling SMT.
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## TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling TSX.
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## If TSX is enabled, clear CPU buffer rings on transitions and disable SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx=off"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt"
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## Mark all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable to mitigate iTLB multihit.
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## iTLB Multihit:
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by marking all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm.nx_huge_pages=force"
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## Mitigations for SRBDS to prevent MDS attacks on RDRAND and RDSEED instructions
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## are only possible through microcode updates from Intel.
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## Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS):
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## Mitigation of the vulnerability is only possible via microcode updates from Intel.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.html
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## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142691
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## Enable the prctl() interface to prevent leaks from L1D on context switches.
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## L1D Flushing:
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## Mitigate leaks from the L1D cache on context switches by enabling the prctl() interface.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1d_flush=on"
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## Mitigate numerous MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
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## MMIO Stale Data:
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer and disabling SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt"
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## Enable mitigations for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with
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## Return Instructions) vulnerability and disable SMT.
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## Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions (Retbleed):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability through CPU-dependent implementation and disable SMT.
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## Currently affects both AMD Zen 1-2 and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retbleed
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## https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/retbleed/
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## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693
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## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/retbleed
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX retbleed=auto,nosmt"
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## Control RAS overflow mitigation on AMD Zen CPUs.
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## Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by ensureing all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location.
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## Currently affects AMD Zen 1-4 CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html
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##
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## The default kernel setting will be utilized until provided sufficient evidence to modify.
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## Using "spec_rstack_overflow=ipbp" may provide stronger security at a greater performance impact.
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##
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret"
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## Enable Gather Data Sampling (GDS) mitigation.
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## Note for systems that have not received a suitable microcode update this will
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## entirely disable use of the AVX instructions set.
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## Gather Data Sampling (GDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability either via microcode update or by disabling AVX.
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## Note, without a suitable microcode update, this will entirely disable use of the AVX instructions set.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX gather_data_sampling=force"
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## Enable Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) mitigation on Intel Atom CPUs which
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## encompasses E-cores on hybrid architectures.
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## Register File Data Sampling (RFDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer.
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## Currently affects Intel Atom CPUs (which encompasses E-cores on hybrid architectures).
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.html
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##
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