mirror of
https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc.git
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174 lines
7.6 KiB
INI
174 lines
7.6 KiB
INI
## Copyright (C) 2019 - 2024 ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP <adrelanos@whonix.org>
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## See the file COPYING for copying conditions.
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## Definitions:
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## KSPP=yes: compliant with recommendations by the KSPP
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## KSPP=partial: partially compliant with recommendations by the KSPP
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## KSPP=no: not (currently) compliant with recommendations by the KSPP
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## If there is no explicit KSPP compliance notice, the setting is not mentioned by the KSPP.
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## Enable known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
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## Note, the mitigations for SSB and Retbleed are not currently mentioned in the first link.
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/should-all-kernel-patches-for-cpu-bugs-be-unconditionally-enabled-vs-performance-vs-applicability/7647
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## Check for potential updates directly from AMD and Intel.
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## https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html
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## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance.html
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## https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/disclosure-documentation.html
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## Enable a subset of known mitigations for some CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
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##
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## KSPP=yes
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## KSPP sets the kernel parameters.
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mitigations=auto,nosmt"
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## Disable SMT as it has been the cause of and amplified numerous CPU exploits.
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## The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable SMT.
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## Disabling will significantly decrease system performance on multi-threaded tasks.
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## Note, this setting will prevent re-enabling SMT via the sysfs interface.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/should-all-kernel-patches-for-cpu-bugs-be-unconditionally-enabled-vs-performance-vs-applicability/7647/17
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## https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/issues/37#issuecomment-619597365
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##
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## KSPP=yes
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## KSPP sets the kernel parameter.
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##
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## To re-enable SMT:
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## - Remove "nosmt=force".
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## - Remove all occurrences of ",nosmt" in this file (note the comma ",").
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## - Downgrade "l1tf=full,force" protection to "l1tf=flush".
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## - Regenerate the dracut initramfs and then reboot system.
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX nosmt=force"
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## Spectre Side Channels (BTI and BHI):
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## Unconditionally enable mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (branch target injection).
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## Enable mitigation for the Intel branch history injection vulnerability.
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## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_v2=on"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spectre_bhi=on"
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## Speculative Store Bypass (SSB):
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## Mitigate Spectre Variant 4 by disabling speculative store bypass system-wide.
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## Unconditionally enable the mitigation for both kernel and userspace.
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## Currently affects both AMD and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass
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## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_store_bypass_disable=on"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX ssbd=force-on"
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## L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling L1D flush runtime control and SMT.
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## If L1D flushing is conditional, mitigate the vulnerability for certain KVM hypervisor configurations.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1tf=full,force"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=always"
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## Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by clearing the CPU buffer cache and disabling SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mds=full,nosmt"
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## TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by disabling TSX.
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## If TSX is enabled, clear CPU buffer rings on transitions and disable SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx=off"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt"
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## iTLB Multihit:
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by marking all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm.nx_huge_pages=force"
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## Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS):
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## Mitigation of the vulnerability is only possible via microcode update from Intel.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.html
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## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142691
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## L1D Flushing:
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## Mitigate leaks from the L1D cache on context switches by enabling the prctl() interface.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX l1d_flush=on"
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## Processor MMIO Stale Data:
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## Mitigate the vulnerabilities by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer and disabling SMT.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt"
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## Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions (Retbleed):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability through CPU-dependent implementation and disable SMT.
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## Currently affects both AMD Zen 1-2 and Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retbleed
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## https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/retbleed/
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## https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693
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## https://access.redhat.com/solutions/retbleed
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX retbleed=auto,nosmt"
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## Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions:
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## Mitigate the vulnerability for certain KVM hypervisor configurations.
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## Currently affects AMD Zen 1-2 CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX kvm.mitigate_smt_rsb=1"
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## Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location.
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## Currently affects AMD Zen 1-4 CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html
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##
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## The default kernel setting will be utilized until provided sufficient evidence to modify.
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## Using "spec_rstack_overflow=ipbp" may provide stronger security at a greater performance impact.
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##
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret"
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## Gather Data Sampling (GDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability either via microcode update or by disabling AVX.
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## Note, without a suitable microcode update, this will entirely disable use of the AVX instructions set.
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## Currently affects Intel CPUs.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX gather_data_sampling=force"
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## Register File Data Sampling (RFDS):
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## Mitigate the vulnerability by appropriately clearing the CPU buffer.
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## Currently affects Intel Atom CPUs (which encompasses E-cores on hybrid architectures).
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX reg_file_data_sampling=on"
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